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The Impact of the "Hunan Provincial
Administrative Procedure Provisions"
By PETER WITHERINGTON*
"Four months later, he was still bringing up that World Bank report; it
was even a little embarrassing."'
-Ying Songnian
In the above statement, Professor Ying was referring to Zhou
Qiang, then the governor of Hunan Province and now secretary of
the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Ying was attempting to convey the dedication with which Zhou, one
of China's up-and-coming political stars, has approached the task of
economic development in Hunan. In April 2008, that dedication
would eventually lead to the passage of the "Hunan Provincial
Administrative Procedure Provisions" 2  (hereinafter "the
Provisions"), a step that would make Hunan the first Chinese
province to draft a comprehensive regulation of administrative
procedure.3 The World Bank report that captured Zhou's attention
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
University of California, Berkeley, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Keith Hand for his
invaluable guidance, without which this Note could not have been written.
1. Professor of law at China University of Political Science and Law and
chairman of the Administrative Law Research Center of the China Law Society,
quoted in Hunan Standardizes Administrative Discretion - Zhou Qiang Includes Anti-
Entrapment Provision, RENMIN WANG (May 11, 2010), http://leaders.people.com.cn/
GB/70158/189969/11566479.htm1 ("494tli IV19 , _
2. Hunan Sheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding (AWWORW9RE) [Hunan
Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions] (promulgated by the 4th
Executive Meeting of the People's Provincial Government, April 9, 2008, effective
Oct. 10, 2008) HUNAN PRov. Gov. GAZ. (China). A bilingual version is available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/IntellectualLife/CL-PP-
HunanAPA_ Bilingual.pdf.
3. Hunan Province Drafts Administrative Procedure Regulation - Experts Praise
Province-First Approach (."(A
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is a 2006 document entitled "China-Governance, investment climate,
and harmonious society: competitive enhancements for 120 cities in
China."4 In the report, Hunan province received dismal ratings: on
a chart ranking the investment-friendliness of thirty cities in China's
central region, only one of the six Hunan cities listed made it out of
the bottom ten.5  Zhou reportedly became obsessed with the
statistic, immediately making "tens of copies" of the report that
would land on the desks of every important figure in the provincial
government. 6
Unlike the vast majority of Chinese officials, Zhou Qiang is a
lawyer by training, experience which no doubt contributed to his
decision to tackle Hunan's developmental woes through legal
reform.7 It was while he was obtaining a master's degree in civil
law that Zhou met Ying Songnian, then a law professor at
Southwest University of Political Science and Law. Zhou and Ying,
along with Jiang Bixin, then the chief judge of Hunan's High
People's Court, would be the driving force behind the Provisions'
drafting and eventual passage by Hunan's Provincial People's
Congress in 2008. It was Ying who first proposed focusing their
efforts on administrative procedure.8 The three men calculated that
the creation of a comprehensive regulation of administrative
procedure would strike a blow against the pervasive bureaucratic
attitude described by Ying as qingshi chengxu (9J#!W)), or "looking
WWW MIGRE*AR AT)), HONG WANG (Apr. 27, 2008),
http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2008/04/27/1494388.htm.
4. WORLD BANK, China-Governance, investment climate, and harmonious society:




5. See id. at 81-82.
6. See RENMIN WANG supra note 1 (ATEPT1±0 8,
7. Su Hai, Zhou Qiang's Strong Regulatory Awareness is Applauded
( (('ZZW M"I~iti" ) ), News of the Communist Party of China, (Aug.
19, 2010), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64103/12489871.htm. See also
China Vitae, Zhou Qiang,
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/ZhouQiang%7C651 (last visited Mar. 13,
2013). Zhou states that an important benefit of his legal education is what he called
his gianglie ge yishi, or "strong regulatory awareness."
8. See RENMIN WANG supra note 1 ('W 6B4Ri& :
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down on procedure." In Ying's view, this lax approach to
governance within Chinese officialdom is a fundamental cause of
ineffective governance at all levels of the Chinese government. 9
This Note will argue that with their passage, the Provisions give
legal significance to previously existing limitations on government
authority and create effective limits on administrative behavior
where there were none before. It will also argue that the Provisions
represent an unprecedented codification of the due process
principle in Chinese law, and that this indicates an embrace of that
principle among at least some of the Chinese political e1ite. Section
one will briefly evaluate the unique nature of Chinese
administrative law and its historical attitude toward the due process
principle. Section two will first address the role the Provisions play
as an administrative procedure regulation within the broader
context of China's administrative law regime before moving on to a
comparative critique of the Provisions themselves, through
illustrative comparisons with similar laws in other East Asian
jurisdictions. Section three will address both the implications of the
Provisions for the future of China's administrative law regime and
developments during the nearly five years since the regulation went
into effect.
I. Administrative Law in Comtemporary China
A. Development and Due Process
Before the importance of the Provisions can be understood, they
must be viewed within the context of Chinese administrative law, a
body of law which developed in response to different circumstances
and different motivations from those that shaped its Western
counterparts. In China, as in the West, administrative law can be
defined as "the use of positive law as a means for controlling public
or governmental behavior."10  Beyond this basic definition,
however, there are historical differences between the ideological
underpinnings of administrative law in China and the West. In
common law and civil law systems of the Western tradition,
administrative law is generally viewed as a tool for regulating the
decision-making process of administrative bodies, in large part to
10. Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction to Part II, in LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA AND
VIETNAM 105 (John Gillespie & Albert H. Y. Chen eds., 2010).
2013]1 625
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
safeguard citizens' rights to due process and transparent
government." Procedural due process is the guarantee of
"procedural fairness where the government would deprive one of
his property or liberty."12
By contrast, some have argued that due process concerns did
not play such a prominent role in the development of modern
Chinese administrative law. The development of administrative
law in China began in earnest immediately following the end of the
Cultural Revolution, and Professor Jianfu Chen has written that its
aim during that time was to "facilitate the restructuring of
government organizations and the institutionalization of state
administration, and to maintain a degree of legitimacy and legality
of the state" in the aftermath of that chaotic period.13 As such,
according Professor Chen, it was not until the 1990s that the
emphasis of administrative law in China began to shift "from being
an instrument of state administration to a legal mechanism for the
protection of individual rights and for the control of state
administrative powers."14 Moreover, Professor Chen writes, this
trend "was perhaps a pure 'accident' - unintended and unexpected
by the leadership of the Party and the government."' 5 While the
development of administrative law has necessarily coincided with
the creation of the Chinese market economy, the ideas that "a citizen
can sue the government, that a government is liable for its
maladministration, and that a government is accountable to the
governed, are revolutionary in a legal culture where government
officials had the status of parents and parents were perceived to be
infallible."' 6 Thus, despite such trends, the ideological conflicts they
create have "led to many internal inconsistencies in the
administrative legal system."' 7
Similarly, Michael W. Dowdle has written that in contrast to the
concern with rights and transparency that characterized similar
developments in the west, the rapid and "spontaneous"
11. REGINALD PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, A TEXT 31 (1952).
12. "Due Process of Law," BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY 146 (2d ed. 1984).
13. Jianfu Chen. The Development and Conception of Administrative Law in the PRC,
16(2) LAW IN CONTEXT 72 (1999).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Chen supra note 13, at 72.
17. Id.
626 [Vol. 36:2
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development of administrative law in modem China was not an
expression of any such "design [or] political intentionality."1
8 This
is unsurprising, as "only in recent years has due process become
a.. . familiar concept in Chinese legal academia. . .. "19 Instead,
Dowdle argues, the development of Chinese administrative law was
driven mainly by two factors. The first was as a response by central
government officials to the recalcitrance of provincial - and local -
level governments that exploited the "increasingly complex
regulatory environments" that have accompanied China's
modernization in order to buck the authority of the central
government.20  The emergence and development of an
administrative legal system since the "reform and opening" period
has been motivated by the desire to "compel lower-level
governmental and party actors to obey central-level, elite dictates."
21
The other and more recent motivation, according to Dowdle, has
been the need to accommodate "international interests," significant
among which have been the "public-law reform" requirements that
were a condition of China's induction into the World Trade
Organization.22 As Dowdle points out, however, the willingness of
Chinese elites to meet international demands for reform does not
mean they necessarily share the international view that
administrative law ought to act as a restraint on central-level, as
well as lower-level government power.23
Thus, if due process is viewed as a guarantee of government
accountability, it has largely been absent from the development of
the modern administrative legal regime. Pitman Potter writes that
modern Chinese regulatory culture "emphasise[s] a dynamic by
which governance is pursued by a sovereign political authority that
remains largely immune to challenge." Sarah Biddulph writes that
while the "expansion of legal norms to regulate an ever-increasing
sphere of activities" has been "the result of conscious state policy"
over the last two decades, it has nonetheless "from the outset ...
been initiated and directed by China's political elites" within an
18. See Id., at 105.
19. He Haibo. Dawn of the Due Process Principle in China. 22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
57, 60 (2008).
20. See Chen supra note 10, at 105.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 106.
23. Id.
6272013]1
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atmosphere of "patrimonial sovereignty" wherein "administrative
agencies have responsibility for society but are not responsible to
it." 24
There are signs that due process concerns are beginning to gain
traction at least among some Chinese policy makers. The principle
of due process was officially enshrined in law for the first time in the
Administrative Litigation Law of 1989,25 which declared
administrative acts that violate legally-mandated process to be
invalid, though the practical impact of the law has been muted. 26 In
2008, legal scholar He Haibo noted similarities between the United
States Supreme Court's "due process revolution" under Earl Warren
in the 1960s and the current environment in Chinese judicial circles,
pointing to noteworthy cases demonstrating the Chinese judiciary's
"activist stance on due process and the development of
administrative law." 27
Nonetheless, the protections and accountability that are the
main concern of Western-style administrative law remain much less
prominent in the Chinese model. Despite the nominal existence of
remedies available to citizens for governmental abuses, local
officials have effectively "[remained] largely immune from
administrative legal discipline." 28  While the Administrative
Litigation Law provides citizens the means to petition for judicial
review of certain types of administrative acts that "[infringe] upon
his or her or its lawful rights and interests," 29 the numerous
obstacles and dead ends facing the typical Chinese litigant who sues
the state mean the rights granted by this landmark law remain a
"beguiling fiction" in the eyes of many, presenting what Chinese
legal scholar Xiao Jianguo has called "a gap between theory and
practice."30
24. SARAH BIDDULPH, LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION POWERS IN
CHINA 32, 41 (2007) (quoting Pitman Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in
China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 119, 125 (2003)).
25. Xingzheng Susong Fa (ORiit W) [Administrative Litigation Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective
Oct. 1, 1990) STANDING CoMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. (China).
26. See He supra note 19, at 60-61.
27. See Id. at 59.
28. See Dowdle supra note 10, at 106.
29. See Administrative Litigation Law art. 2.
30. Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N.Y.
628 [Vol. 36:2
Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions
B. Administrative Punishment
Compounding the problems this presents for citizens' rights,
the scope and, arguably, the importance of administrative law is
substantially greater in China than in most Western countries,
thanks mainly to the existence of China's broad array of
administrative punishments, or xingzheng chufa ( ikkTM). While
penalties and fees are a mainstay of Western-style administrative
law, Chinese administrative law possesses a much broader range of
punishments than those found in the Western model, including
administrative detention (incarceration).31 Although administrative
detention powers are intended to be used in those cases deemed
"not to be sufficiently serious to warrant a criminal sanction," this
broad punitive authority nonetheless grants government officials
significant coercive powers that are "largely legally
unconstrained." 32  The system of administrative punishment
operates alongside the criminal justice system, with the purpose of
"target[ing] people seen as posing a threat to social order,
undermining the ethical life of society and harming the overall
modernization programme."33
II. The Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure
Provisions
A. The Need for Administrative Procedure Reform
The concept of administrative law reform, therefore, carries
with it a broader significance in the People's Republic of China than
in most Western countries. While it includes all meanings of the
term familiar to the Western legal scholar, it also encompasses
elements of what in the West could only be described as criminal
procedure. As Sarah Biddulph has pointed out, this is significant in
that "the regulation and exercise of police administrative detention
powers have arguably been amongst the most problematic areas in
the programme of rebuilding China's legal system in the reform
TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2005.
31. See BIDDULPH supra note 24, at 3-6. Perhaps the most notorious form of
administrative detention is "reeducation through labor" or laodong jiaoyang
(Wi;## ), often referred to as laojiao (9M).
32. See BIDDULPH supra note 24, at 6.
33. Id.
6292013]
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era,"34 and the reform of such powers has traditionally been
strongly resisted by Chinese public security organs, which remain
"one of the main forces to buttress the power of the Chinese
Communist Party and enforce its policies." 35 In light of these facts,
the Provisions are especially noteworthy because their scope
encompasses all forms of administrative power, including that of
the police and other public security organizations. While most of
the limitations the Provisions place on the actions of such
organizations are themselves limited by "escape devices," mainly
exceptions in circumstances which implicate "state secrets,"
"national interest" and the like, the regulation nonetheless
establishes a powerful trend towards meaningful reform of the
powers of the organs of public security. 36
Given administrative law's lofty role in China, the absence of a
comprehensive, national-level regulation of administrative
procedure is an issue of great concern. While substantive
administrative law provides the means by which government action
can be limited, administrative procedure dictates the manner in
which those limits can be enforced, and a unified regulation of
administrative procedure has been considered "an important part of
a comprehensive administrative law system in many civil
jurisdictions."37 In the absence of a comprehensive regulation,
China's "administrative procedure rules are sporadic and lack
necessary cohesion and uniformity[,] which have resulted in
conflicts among the principles or rules within the procedural
system."38 Without unified standards, administrative procedure
suffers a lack of "openness, systematization, institutionalization,
and... reasonableness." 39 As Zheng Ge writes, although in many
cases the necessary substantive administrative law exists, there
persists a lack of "middle level institutional designs to solve
operational problems." 40 The impact of these shortcomings is
especially evident when one considers the requirement of
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 5.
36. See Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions arts. 5, 8.
37. Zheng Ge Toward regulatory neutrality in a Party-State? in LEGAL REFORMS IN
CHINA AND VIETNAM supra note 10, at 120.
38. Wang Xixin, Between Dreams and the Reality: Making of the Administrative
Procedure Act in China, 7 J. KOREAN L. 157, 166 (2007-08).
39. Id. at 157.
40. See Zheng supra note 37, at 121.
630 [Vol. 36:2
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procedural legality articulated in the Administrative Litigation Law
applies only in the context of administrative action that "violates
statutory procedures." 41 As Chinese legal scholar Wang Xixin
points out, this creates significant gaps in enforceability because
"the reality is that there exist wide varieties of administrative
governance that are not governed by 'statutory procedures."' 42
Writing before the passage of the Procedures, Wang suggested
two major goals for national reform: first, he advocated the creation
of "fair and rational procedural rules ... to govern any and all
administrative actions that may affect rights and interests of private
parties or public interest in administrative process," and second,
that "legal effect must be attached to fundamental principles that
aim to guarantee procedural fairness, rationality, and
reasonableness," which are presently unprotected due to the broad
discretion that is currently left to administrative officials.43 As
Wang points out, concern with procedural due process has begun to
take root, albeit slowly, and other administrative legislation that has
appeared since the passage of the Administration Litigation Law
has made efforts to incorporate these principles.44 Nonetheless, the
creation of a unified, national regulation of administrative
procedure is a critical step in cementing the making these legal
principles a practical reality in Chinese administrative law.45
However, although the creation of national-level
Administrative Procedure Act was included in the Tenth National
People's Congress Legislative Plan46 in 2006, efforts to draft the law
have been inconclusive, with fifteen separate drafts prepared by the
following National People's Congress in 2008.47 This has been
attributed to the fact that the public hearings, popular participation
and other "institutional arrangements" necessary for the drafting of
a law that meets the demands of fairness, transparency and
accountability would "involve mobilizing ordinary citizens and
41. See Wang supra note 38, at 158.
42. See id. at 159.
43. Id. at 160.
44. Id. Specifically, Wang cites the Regulation on Administrative Reconsideration
of 1990 and Administrative Reconsideration Law of 1999.
45. Id. at 158.
46. See HONG WANG supra note 3 ("2006I , TWilW AVIE3XPJkt
47. See Zheng supra note 37, at 120.
6312013]1
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have the effect of democratization at the grass-roots level,"
something the central government is not ready to embrace on a
large scale.48
Besides political concerns, the sheer difficulty of the task has
also presented an obstacle.49 As Wang Xixin points out, many see
the drafting of a national Administrative Procedure Act as a
momentous event that amounts to "reinventing government," one
that requires "subtle integration of ideas and realities of
fundamental principles and practices of the administrative
process."o Professor Ma Huaide of China University of Political
Science and Law points out that an Administrative Procedure Act is
an important act of legislation that must be approached cautiously,
and because China cannot base its own law upon the experiences of
other countries, it must go through a relatively long period of
exploration and the accumulation of experience.5'
Cognizant of the need for gradual innovation, some reformers
who had previously been focused on drafting national-level
regulation began to look for an alternative approach. One such
reformer was Zhou's collaborator Ying Songnian. Frustrated with
the stalled national drafting process, Ying decided to bring his zeal
for reform to bear at the provincial level, and in Zhou Qiang he
found the perfect partner to realize his ambitions.52
B. Purpose of the Provisions
The Provisions can be seen as serving multiple purposes within
the legal system of Hunan province and that of the country as a
whole. First, the regulation improves administrative governance by
creating and strengthening meaningful restrictions on official
conduct. Second, as discussed above, the regulation serves the
symbolic as well as utilitarian purpose of codifying the normative
and legal principle of procedural due process. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the Provisions represent a Politburo-sanctioned
48. See id.
49. See Wang supra note 38, at 158.
50. Id.
51. See HONG WANG supra note 3 (" -
52. See RENMIN WANG supra note 1.
632 [Vol. 36:2
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legislative experiment, laying the groundwork for a future national-
level regulation.
1. Effective Administrative Governance
Article 1 of the Provisions states that the regulation of
administrative procedure will ensure "the exercise of administrative
power by administrative organs" is carried out "in a ... highly
efficient way."53  Besides increasing administrative efficiency,
Article 3 of the Provisions state that all "[a]dministrative actions.. .
shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of the law," thereby
shoring restrictions on government activity that had previously
been weakly enforced, if at all.
Tackling official corruption is another important facet of this
objective, and the Provisions fit within a trend of reform that has
been ongoing in Hunan under Zhou Qiang's stewardship. At the
time of their inception, Zhou was already in the midst of launching
an anti-corruption reform known as "five steps" or wubuzou
( )which would require any administrative actions taking
place at or above the county level that involved demolition, takings,
fee collection and some other issues to conform to a five-step
procedure: research and investigation, expert review and approval,
public consultation, legal review and collective analysis.54 In a news
article entitled "Zhou Qiang: Resolutely Carry Out Anti-Corruption
Work within the Government," Zhou Qiang describes the impact
the Provisions are meant to have on corruption in the province.55
2. Due Process
Although the immediate catalyst that stirred Zhou Qiang to
take action was Hunan's poor business climate, equally important to
Zhou and his colleagues was to enshrine principles of due process,
including transparency, in the provincial legal system. Ying
Songnian stated explicitly in 2008 that he believes the popularization
of the concept of "due process rights" is a substantial part of the
53. See Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions art. 1.
54. See RENMIN WANG supra note 1 ("iMEW5, ViiE. M
55. Zhou Qiang: Resolutely Carry Out Anti-Corruption Work within the Government
(41: ETaW lAR nilliMIS) ), HUNAN LOCAL TAXATION
BUREAU (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.hnds.gov.cn/hnmh/ssxc/qfds/1zzd/
content_406057.html.
2013] 633
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regulation's significance. 56 Administrative due process is a fluid
concept that defies simple definition, but Yale Law School professor
Jerry L. Mashaw has written in an influential article that it ought to
be viewed as the amalgamation of the principles of equality,
predictability, transparency, rationality, and participation.57 The
seminal case in the United States involving administrative due
process involved granting of a fair hearing. 58  Most of these
principles, along with others commonly associated with due
process, are explicitly addressed in the Provisions.
Equality is addressed in Chapter 1, Article 4 of the Provisions.
The article contains text that resembles an equal protection clause:
"administrative organs should treat citizens, legal persons and other
organizations equally and may not discriminate against any of
them."59 The article also states that when an objective can be
achieved through multiple means, administrative organs must
always choose the option that is "most favorable to maximizing
protection of the rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and
other organizations."60
Predictability is addressed in many sections of the Provisions.
Article 3 guarantees that all administrative actions will be based in
existing law, regulations and rules, and will adhere to legally-
stipulated procedures. 61 Article 8 states that "[a]dministrative
organs may not revoke or revise administrative decisions that are in
force because of reasons other than matters stipulated law, or
without going through the legal procedures," though this is subject
to the limitation that decisions may be revoked or revised because of
"national" or "public" interests.62  Article 30 aims to ensure
objectivity and standardization, stating that administrative decision-
making must be "carried out in accordance with the law in a
56. First Administrative Procedure Regulation to Be Drafted in Hunan
(( E TiF % i1A 10) ), SANXIANG CTY EXPRESS (Feb. 24, 2008),
http://sxdsb.voc.com.cn/article/20082/2008224711286556301.html.
57. Jerry L. Mashaw. "Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory" (1981). 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899-904.
58. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
59. See supra note 2 at Art. 4.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 2 at Art. 3.
62. Id. at Art. 8.
634 [Vol. 36:2
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scientific [] way." 63
Transparency is addressed in Article 5, which states,
"administrative organs should make public to citizens, legal persons
and other organizations the basis, processes and outcomes of their
exercise of administrative power ... ." 4 However, the significance
of this Article is blunted by the addendum of a typical limitation,
stating that this requirement will be waived in the case of those
exercises of administrative power that deal with "state secrets," as
well as "legally protected commercial secrets" and "the privacy of
individuals." See page 18, infra, for further discussion of
administrative transparency.
Participation is addressed throughout the Provisions. Article 6
states that "citizens, legal persons and other organizations have the
right to participate in administrative management according to the
law and to put forward opinions and recommendations on
administrative management," and also requires the government to
provide the necessary conditions for such participation. 65 Article 38
deals with the requirement of the granting of a fair hearing, stating
that "[a] hearing should be held" when an administrative decision
"involves a major interest of the general public," when "the general
public has major differences on the decision-making plan," when "it
might influence social stability," and when "laws, regulations or
rules stipulate that a hearing should be held." 6 6 Finally, timeliness
is addressed in Article 7, which states that "[w]hen exercising
administrative power, administrative organs should abide by the
time limits established by law . . . ."67
3. Paving the Way for a National Regulation
Finally, the Provisions are also intended to serve as trial
legislation, with an eye towards eventual implementation of a
national-level law. A contemporary state-media report details this
plan through interviews with various scholars and officials with
knowledge of the process.68 Professor Wang Wanhua of Zhengfa
University writes that typically, before large-scale legal reform is
63. Id. at Art. 30.
64. Id. at Art. 5.
65. Id. at Art. 6.
66. See supra note 2 at Art. 38.
67. Id. at Art. 7.
68. See supra note 3.
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endorsed by the central government, it will typically endorse
experimental legislation at the local or agency level, with the lessons
learned from those experiences are then applied to the national-level
reform.69 According to Jiang Bixin (the former Chief Judge of
Hunan's High People's Court), the ability of Hunan province to pass
its own administrative procedure law relatively smoothly and
quickly was probably "inseparable" from the "scientific and
practical approach to development" of local government officials
and their loyalty to the concept of rule of law.70
C. Critique of the Provisions
How effective has the regulation been in accomplishing its
objectives? On the whole, academic and public reception of the
Provisions has been positive.7' One enthusiastic Chinese
commentator registered his approval in 2008, writing that the
Provisions successfully incorporated principles of rational
administration and more democratic governance within a specific
procedural framework. 72 Jamie P. Horsley has written favorably of
the extent to which the Provisions incorporate public participation
and transparency, especially through its notice-and-comment
requirements. 73 However, much of the public response has been
anticipatory in nature, and in nearly five years since the Provisions'
passage, there remains relatively little scholarship regarding their
implementation and their immediate effects. Without a large
sample of empirical data, it is difficult to assess the degree to which
courts and administrative organs are invoking and complying with
69. Id.
71. See, e.g., supra notes 3 and 7.
72. Tian Feilong, Advancing Scientific Decision Making through
Administration - Critiquing the Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure
Provisions
9."(W i"R") BEIDA FALO
WANG. (2008). http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleDetail.asp?ArticlelD=44157
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
73. Jamie P. Horsley. "Public Participation in the People's Republic: Developing
a More Participatory Governance Model in China." China Law Center. Yale Law
School. 2009. Available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual
..Life/CL-PP-PP-inthePRCFINAL_91609.pdf.
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the Provisions.
1. Emergency Powers
Despite the dearth of empirical data, some scholars have issued
criticisms of various aspects of the Provisions. Writing in 2009,
Professor Liu Li highlights what he views as the lack of legal
safeguards within the Provisions.74 Professor Liu focuses on Article
3 of the Provisions, which he characterizes as a "doctrine of
legality," or hefaxing yuanze (I5ftlJtfR11), a provision which requires
that the administrative functions and powers of administrative
organs are legally delegated and are rooted in proper legal
authority.75 Article 3, which Professor Liu describes as fairly typical
of such provisions, reads: "Administrative actions ... shall be taken
in accordance with the provisions of the law, regulations and rules
and within the legal scope of authority and comply with the
administrative procedures stipulated by law."7 6  According to
Professor Liu, however, Article 3 lacks the kinds of "extensive
considerations" or waiyanxing kaolii (AMEA$) clause generally
employed in other such provisions, such as a limitation on an
administrative body's emergency powers.7
Professor Liu points to Macao's Administrative Procedure Code
as a comparative illustration. The relevant provision of that code
(also Article 3) has a subsection which reads: "In emergency
situations, administrative activities that are not derived from the
principles established by this code shall only be permissible if they
are effective on balance and if the same effect cannot be achieved
through legal means. Victims have the right to recover any damages
according to the standard principles of the responsible
administrative organ." 78 According to Professor Liu, it is this type
of measure that allows administrative organs to know the extent of
their authority under emergency conditions and preserves the
74. Liu Li, An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Regulations in Hunan
Province from the Perspective of Comparative Administrative Law
((( ItWRWNER"Mf Afr MtWfRRlM9 f )) LEGAL SYSTEM AND
SOcIETY (2009), available at http://www.doc88.com/p-69139129596.html.
75. Id.
76. See Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions art. 3; See also,
Liu supra note 74 at 217 ("itS'1MM *A (l J )1lli# #---").
77. See Liu supra note 74, at 217 (" i IE
78. CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. Article 3. Macao.
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predictability of consistency that is fundamental to the rule of law.79
This is critical in order to prevent forcing administrative organs to
take actions that are without legal basis in emergency situations.80
2. Administrative Discretion
a) Comparative Analysis
Administrative discretion can be generally defined as "[tihe
exercise of professional expertise and judgment, as opposed to strict
adherence to regulations or statutes, in making a decision or
performing official acts or duties."81 Although necessary for the
proper function of any administrative agency, administrative
discretion is also extremely problematic, and the regulation of
administrative discretion is one of the main issues that
administrative procedure is intended to address. The way in which
the Provisions tackle this issue gives insight into the nature of the
regulation as a whole. Different legal systems have taken diverse
approaches to this issue.
In order to understand where the approach used in the
Provisions falls among them, it is illustrative to look to the
approaches employed by South Korea and Japan, two so-called
"developmental states," in their administrative procedure reforms
in the 1990s. While China, with its tradition of Soviet-style
government, has not generally been grouped with the other East
Asian "developmental states," it shares with those states the
experience of transitioning from a system of broad administrative
discretion to a system of tighter, more regulated administrative
action. Like China today, "administrative discretion was at the core
of the developmental state model" until the 1990s. 82 According to
Tom Ginsburg, however, each country took very different
approaches to the regulation of administrative discretion.83
79. See Liu supra note 74, at 217 ("it ... MRR 1J
80. Id. (~~1 ~ W
81. "Administrative Discretion," WEST's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW
(1997).
82. Tom Ginsburg. "Dismantling the Developmental State - Administrative
Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea." 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (2001).
83. Id. at 586.
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In Japan, which passed its first comprehensive administrative
procedure law in 1993, Ginsburg argues that the long tenure of the
Japanese regime that was in power at that time disincentivized the
passage of strong reforms, and the result was "a statute that does
very little to constrain the bureaucracy."84 While the statute
purports to apply legal guidelines to many forms of administrative
agency behavior, it in fact merely formalizes the system of
"administrative guidance" that existed previously, a system of
informal, extralegal activities by which administrative agencies
carry out their roles.85 Ginsburg argues that far from enhancing
government transparency and accountability, the Japanese approach
"may actually encourage opaqueness in administration .. ." 86
In South Korea, by contrast, Ginsburg argues that passage of
the administrative procedure law in 1993 coincided with political
upheaval and rapid societal changes, which engendered a greater
openness to meaningful reform. 87 Unlike the Japanese law, the
South Korean reform places limits on administrative discretion,
including numerous important restrictions on the rule-making
process.88 Other reforms include a 1997 law which allows citizens to
petition for the review of any administrative act that even
"inconveniences or burdens" citizens. 89 All told, the South Korean
approach to administrative procedure reform provides for the
"external control of bureaucrats," while the Japanese approach does
not.90
b) The Provisions' Approach
Which of these approaches do the Provisions adopt? The
approach is broadly laid out in Article 4, which states that "the
exercise of discretionary power by administrative organs should
conform with their legislated purposes and principles."91 The issue
is tackled in greater detail in Section 7, titled "Standards of
Administrative Discretion." In this section, Article 91 states that
84. Id.
85. Id. at 601.
86. See supra note 82 at 601.
87. Id. at 586.
88. Id. at 608.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 610.
91. See supra note 2 at Art. 4.
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"[w]hen laws... stipulate that an administrative organ has
discretionary power, standards for administering such discretion
should be formulated to detail and quantify the discretionary
power .... The standards for administrative discretion should be
made public to the society." 92 Article 92 proceeds to provide
guidelines for use by administrative organs in the promulgation of
their own internal standards for administrative discretion, including
"any factors that might affect the reasonableness of the exercise of
administrative discretionary power." 93 However effectively these
provisions have been implemented and followed, the approach
adopted by the drafters clearly goes farther than the simple
codification of principles of "administrative guidance" that is the
centerpiece of the Japanese reform (although the Provisions do
contain an extensive section 94 covering administrative guidance).
If these limits were not enough, however, Zhou Qiang and Ying
Songnian tackled the issue of administration discretion in a separate
piece of legislation, the Hunan Provincial Measure on Standardizing
Administrative Discretion.95 Drafting this legislation was "even
more difficult" than drafting the Provisions, according Professor
Tang Shiyue of Renmin University of China, who took part in both
processes. 96 Zhou was motivated to go beyond the Provisions to
create even stricter controls on administrative discretion in part by
popular anger at the "four arbitraries" or si luan (IR): "arbitrary
approval, arbitrary fines, arbitrary investigation and arbitrary
fees."97 Stories were reported of bureaucrats taking advantage of
the wide latitude in administrative fines as a means of coercion. 98
The measure introduces restrictions meant to further narrow this
latitude, including Chapter 1, Article 3, which states that the
boundaries of administrative discretion ought to adhere to
92. Id. at Art. 91.
93. See supra note 2 at Art. 92.
94. Id. at Chapter 5, Section 2.
95. Hunan Sheng Guifan Xingzheng Cailiangquan Banfa (Aitit3ilf
ikRAWTE) [Hunan Provincial Measure on Standardizing Administrative
Discretion] (promulgated by the 40th Executive Meeting of the People's Provincial




96. See supra note 1.
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principles of fairness, justice and transparency.99 Chapter 1, Article
5 also requires supervision of the execution of administrative
discretion by all levels of government above the county level.100
Viewed against the backdrop of the South Korean and Japanese
models, there is reason to be optimistic about the real impact the
Provisions will have on administrative discretion, and thus, on open
and effective government.
Finally, transparency is one of the most effective checks on
abuse of administrative discretion. The way in which the Provisions
themselves will address transparency is discussed on page 14, supra,
of this Note. However, a national-level regulation, adopted in 2007,
may prove even more effective in increasing administrative
transparency. Entitled Regulations of the People's Republic of
China on Open Government Information 01 (hereinafter "ROGI"),
the regulation has often been identified with the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) in the United States and similar laws in
other jurisdictions.102 Article 1 of the regulation states that it has
been formulated "to ensure that citizens, legal persons and other
organizations obtain government information in accordance with
the law, enhance transparency of the work of government, promote
administration in accordance with the law, and bring into full play
the role of government information . . . ."103 Under the regulation,
administrative agencies are obligated to disclose vast quantities of
information on their own initiative, and any citizen wishing to
receive an accounting of the basis on which any administrative
action was made as well as an account of the decision-making
process is entitled to "prompt" and "accurate" disclosure of the
information by the relevant government agency.104 The process by
99. See Hunan Provincial Measure on Standardizing Administrative Discretion,
ch. 1 art. 3 ("MEA R WIE. '9JTAf)%
DQJh ").
100. See id., ch. 1, art. 5 ("H 4 AAIAA
101. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli
( X~AA l AgglJ) [Regulations of the People's Republic of China
on Open Government Information] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 5, 2007,
effective May 1, 2008) ST. COUNCIL GAZ. (China). A bilingual version is available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/IntellectualLife/CL-PP-
HunanAPABilingual.pdf.
102. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (2009).
103. See supra note 101 at Art. 1.
104. Id. at Art. 6.
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which citizens may file a request is detailed in Article 13 of the
regulation. 105 Predictably, Article 14 also contains a provision that
exempts government agencies from disclosing information that is
sensitive, involving "state secrets," "commercial secrets" or
"individual privacy." 106 However, even in the short time since the
regulation's passage, there have been several documented instances
in which the law has been used successfully by citizens. In one case
in Anhui province, a group of citizens ingeniously applied the
regulation in the midst of an eviction dispute with the provincial
government.107 When the citizens first brought their case under the
Administrative Litigation Law, the courts did not accept the case.108
However, after the plaintiffs' attorney subsequently filed a petition
under ROGI, the court accepted the case.
III. Conclusion
In summary, the Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure
Provisions is a groundbreaking regulation with wide-reaching
ramifications both in Hunan province and in the entire People's
Republic of China. The regulation represents a growing consensus
among the Chinese political elite that the full embrace of
administrative due process is necessary for effective and fair
governance, and for the continued growth and stability of the
country. The Provisions also contain many of the boilerplate
exclusions that are typical of statutes in the People's Republic of
China, and it is difficult to determine with any certainty whether
Chinese courts will be willing to constrain themselves to the terms
of the regulation. Nonetheless, from all available indications, the
Provisions seem likely to have a substantial effect on the way in
which Hunan's administrative agencies perform their duties, as well
as on the ways in which Hunan citizens seek redress for
administrative abuses.
The Provisions are also an encouraging indication of the trend
in administrative law reform at the national level. While the
national-level regulation has been through countless incarnations, it
105. See supra note 101 at Art. 13.
106. Id. at Art. 14.
107. Donald C. Clarke. "Court Takes Freedom-of-Information Case Against
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is likely that the success of the Hunan regulation will provide
valuable experience and momentum to that process. Compared to
the trends of administrative law reform in East Asia, the Provisions
appear to take a progressive and ambitious approach to
administrative procedure, and specifically to the restriction of
bureaucratic discretion, and are a promising indicator that the
Chinese government may be taking seriously the need for
procedural due process in order to combat corruption, stagnation,
and ineffective governance. Recent developments only support this
view, as Zhou Qiang was selected president of the Supreme
People's Court at the annual session of the 12th National People's
Congress in March.109 With this appointment, it seems likely that
any national-level regulation of administrative procedure will build
upon the foundation laid by the Provisions.
109. Zhou Qiang Elected President of China Supreme People's Court, PEOPLE'S DAILY
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://english.people.com.cn/90785/
8 169 03 5 .html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2013).
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